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This study examines the potential causal effect of parental divorce on child educational at-
tainments, using annual data on individuals covering the entire time span between birth until
the completion of ones schooling drawn from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). A
joint hazard model of schooling attainment and parental marital dissolution is estimated, allow-
ing for correlations between unobserved factors that affect the parents’ human capital investment
choices toward their children and their decision to divorce. After accounting for dynamic varia-
tions in family socioeconomic circumstances, experiences, and family unobserved heterogeneity,
this study ﬁnds no evidence that divorce negatively affects children’s long-term educational at-
tainments. The ﬁndings suggest that the differences in educational attainments between children
of divorced and intact parents are not attributable to divorce, but rather the underlying mechanism
that triggered divorce in the ﬁrst place.
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11 Introduction
The startling growth in divorce rates and the number of children involved1 has became an object
of grave concern among policy makers and spawned voluminous research in the social sciences.
Compared to individuals raised in intact families, individuals who experienced parental divorce while
growing up are commonly found to have lower educational attainments, a precursor of unemployment
and poverty in adulthood. These ﬁndings are frequently cited by advocates to promote marriage and
restrict access to divorce.2 However, although the negative association between parental divorce and
child outcomes are well-documented,3 even after accounting for preexisting disadvantages (Sandefur
et al., 1992; McLanahan and Sandefur, 1994), evidence on whether divorce in itself has a causal
impact on children is far from conclusive.
Divorce may be a consequence of a long process of relationship deterioration between the spouses,
during which the quality of parenting and therefore children involved may suffer. Hence, parents’ di-
vorce and adverse child outcomes may both be driven by common unobserved factors.4 However,
attempts to account for the endogeneity of divorce is challenged by both data and methodological
limitations. First, prior family histories informative of the processes of parental relationship dissolu-
tion and child investment behavior tend to be observed only during a brief period (i.e., late childhood,
adolescence, ...etc) in many datasets. Consequently the ﬁndings may only apply to the targeted age
groups (Manski et al., 1992; Todd and Wolpin, 2003). Secondly, while a natural experiment in this
context is infeasible for obvious ethical concerns, ﬁnding a suitable instrument proves to be extra-
ordinarily difﬁcult. Alternative identiﬁcation methods such as quasi-experiments using individuals
1The number of divorces per year increased from 393,000 in 1960 to 1,182,000 in 1990; while the number of children
involved in parental divorces increased from 463,000 in 1960 to 1,075,000 in 1990. Note that the collection of detailed
data on marriage and divorce in the U.S. was suspended by the NCHS beginning in January 1996 (See Federal Register
Notice, Dec. 15, 1995). Limitations in the information collected by the states as well as budgetary considerations neces-
sitated this action. Hence, we cite from the most recent comprehensive analyses published in Advance Report of Final
Marriage Statistics, 1989-90 and Advance Report of Final Divorce Statistics, 1989-90.
2Atthefederallevel, PresidentBush’sWelfareReauthorizationPlancommitsmillionsoffundingtoprojectspromoting
the stability of marriage. Several states have also passed covenant marriage legislations to discourage divorce. Covenant
marriage legislation mandates that couples agree upon marriage to limited grounds of divorce. It has been passed in the
states of Louisiana, Arkansas, and Arizona, and proposed in the states of Oregon, Georgia, Texas, Oklahoma, Florida,
New Hampshire, Indiana, and Michigan.
3Children from divorced families are generally found to have worse educational, behavioral, and psychological out-
comes compared to children raised in continuously intact two-parent families (Furstenberg and Cherlin, 1991; Emery,
1999). Furthermore, the gap seems to persist well into adulthood (Amato and Keith, 1991).
4An extreme example such as mental or physical cruelty (Kitson and Sussman, 1982), may increase the probability of
divorce and have long-term implications on children.
2experienced with parental bereavement as a reference group have been proposed, but the underlying
assumption that parental death is exogenously driven may be inappropriate. Finally, sibling ﬁxed
effect models which utilizes variations between siblings rely on data of families with at least two chil-
dren. The ﬁndings may be limited in their generalizability since families that are relatively unstable
tend to have fewer children and divorce sooner (Lillard and Waite, 1993).
This study investigates the potential casual link between parental divorce and child educational at-
tainment, using data on a total of 3,044 individuals from 2,004 families drawn from the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID). Annual family socioeconomic circumstances and experiences are ob-
served for each individual beginning at birth until his/er completion of formal schooling, spanning
a total of 32 years. Parental divorce and child investment decisions are modeled as a joint duration
process, allowing for dynamic variations in family circumstances and correlation between the un-
observables triggering divorce and affecting child development. The ﬁndings show that unobserved
factors that increase the likelihood of divorce, rather then divorce itself, explain the differences in
attainments between children from intact vs. divorced families.
The joint model complements existing methodologies used in the literature by incorporating the
advantages of each technique mentioned above into the joint model. Similar to the sibling ﬁxed effects
models, shared family factors across siblings can be controlled for by clustering at the family level.
In addition, state marriage and divorce legislations identiﬁed as potential instruments in previous
researchareusedasadditionalexclusionaryrestrictions. Inlinewiththequasi-experimentalapproach,
individuals from bereaved families are included as an additional control group. Finally, by using a
random sample of individuals who experienced divorce at all ages while growing up, rather than
speciﬁc age groups, the ﬁndings in this study may be more generalizable for understanding the overall
impact of parental divorce on children.
2 Review of Findings and Methodologies
Individuals experienced with parental divorce while growing up are less likely to complete high
school, attend college, and hold a job (Amato et al., 1995; Biblarz and Raftery, 1999; Garasky, 1995;
McLanahan, 1985), however whether parental divorce is to blame remains an open question. Cherlin
3et al. (1991) ﬁnd that observable disadvantages prior to divorce can explain a signiﬁcant portion, but
not all, of the differences in child outcomes. While the literature base widely recognized that there
may be unobservables driving both parental divorce and child outcomes (Haveman and Wolfe, 1995),
and various estimation strategies have been employed to address this issue (Ribar, 2006), there is little
consensus as to whether divorce in itself has a causal effect on child attainments.
Pre-existing disadvantages have been found to partially explain the differences in outcomes be-
tween children from divorce and intact families (Painter and Levine, 2000), and for some the inferior
outcomes were visible even prior to divorce (Cherlin et al., 1991). To disentangle the effect of divorce
from other mediating factors, ideally one would have access to information on all past and present
parental inputs and family experiences (Todd and Wolpin, 2003). However, most available datasets
including many prominent longitudinal surveys, do not provide entire family histories of individuals
since birth while growing up.5 In turn, family structure changes and home environment are only ob-
servable for the observational period, making it difﬁcult to separate the effect of divorce from prior
disadvantages.Empirical studies are typically limited to examining the effect of divorce either during
childhood or adolescence, but never both.6 Given that these studies are based on different age groups,
comparisons are nearly impossible and the results may not be generalizable for other age groups.
Reconciling existing ﬁndings is further complicated by the use of different methodological ap-
proaches in dealing with the endogeneity of divorce. Gruber (2004) utilizes state level differences in
divorce legislations as instruments for divorce. However, such instruments may not be able to detect
any effects on divorce if few people are on the margin where the inconvenience of more stringent
divorce requirements matter. Furthermore, Card (1999) and Heckman et al. (1999) point out that re-
lying on instruments may also fail if there are differences in response to an event across people which
subsequently affect their decision-making. Exogenous differences in divorce stringency may induce
those who foresee large divorce gains to divorce in areas with arduous restrictions, whereas those who
foresee small gains may divorce in areas with fewer restrictions: The size of the effect on well-being
will vary systematically with the otherwise exogenous costs of divorce.
5E.g., The National Education Longitudinal Survey (NELS) provides information on children from eighth grade on-
wards, and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) begins interviewing individuals of age 14 or older.
6E.g., Cherlin et al. (1991) use data on individuals who experienced parental divorce during middle childhood, while
Corak (2001) and Painter and Levine (2000) focus only on the effect of family structure changes during teenage years.
4Fixed effects models applied to data on siblings account for their shared family background and
upbringing. Identiﬁcation generally relies on the difference in time exposed to divorce across siblings.
Sandefur and Wells (1999), Ermisch and Francesconi (2001), Bjorklund et al. (2006) and Ginther and
Pollak (2003) all ﬁnd that the correlation between family structure and child outcomes is reduced but
remains signiﬁcant, while no signiﬁcant effect found by Gennetian (2005) and San de Galdeano and
Vuri (2006). However, factors that are ﬁxed across siblings and biases associated with unobserved
factors that vary across siblings cannot be identiﬁed nor corrected. In addition, Ribar (2006) points
out that the stable non-intact families, which are most common in longitudinal datasets but may not
be representative of non-intact families in general, do not contribute useful variation.
Recently some researchers have introduced children from bereaved families as an additional con-
trol group to identify the effect of divorce on children. Under the assumption that parental bereave-
ment is generally due to exogenous reasons, differences in outcomes between children from divorced
and bereaved families are interpreted as the causal effect of divorce. Lang and Zagorsky (2000), Fron-
stin et al. (2001), and Corak (2001) ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences in child outcomes between these two
family types, and cite it as evidence of a large selection effect of divorce. However, interpreting the
differences in child outcomes between divorced and bereaved families as the causal effect of divorce
may be inappropriate: First, the assumption that parental loss through death is exogenous is question-
able;7 Secondly, the differences in child outcomes may reﬂect differences in socioeconomic support
systems and parenting behaviors between these two types of families, rather than selection.
This study examines the potential causal effect of divorce on child educational attainment by
modeling parents’ investment in children’s human capital and marriage dissolution as a joint duration
process.8 Duration models (as opposed to static methods) are able to keep track of the sequence
and the evolution of experiences in the course of one’s family life and schooling. To account for the
endogeneity of divorce, correlations between unobserved factors that inﬂuence each of these decisions
are allowed and the two processes are estimated jointly. In addition, we incorporate (1) mother ﬁxed-
effects, (2) state level divorce legislations as additional exclusionary restrictions, and (3) children
7For example, physical violence can either lead to divorce, but in extreme cases it can lead to spousal homicide
(Stevenson and Wolfers, 2003).
8Hazard models have been used to estimate the effect of family structure on premarital childbearing behavior of
teenagers (Wu and Martinson, 1993), but not in modeling children’s educational attainments.
5from bereaved families as an additional reference group to enhance the identiﬁability of the model.
3 Data and Study Sample
This study uses longitudinal data on a sample of individuals and their parents drawn from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), 1968 - 2001.9 The PSID began interviewing a nationally repre-
sentative cross-sectional sample of individuals residing in 5,500 households across the United States
in 1968. Follow-up interviews were conducted annually, and are still on going.10 The PSID is well
suited for this study because ﬁrst, complete histories of socioeconomic conditions and other back-
ground characteristics for each individual are continuously (annually) observed from birth until the
completion of his/er schooling. Second, marital status information of all individuals is collected at
each interview. This together with a complete retrospective marital and fertility history allow us to
precisely date marital status changes (including remarriages).11 Finally, the sample of married cou-
ples with children is large, with a sizable portion of these families experiencing divorce during the
observational period. The entire age range of children at risk of experiencing divorce is represented.
The study sample includes only individuals born within the ﬁrst eleven waves (1968 - 1978) into
the original core of PSID households. Restricting the sample in this manner allows sufﬁcient time
to observe each individual’s ﬁnal educational attainment, as measured by one’s years of schooling
completed.12 For an individual to be included in our sample, one must satisfy all four of the following
9The PSID is sponsored and distributed by Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, University
of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI.
10Individuals who left or join the original sample of households are also included and followed.
11Starting in 1985, the PSID collects information on retrospective relationship histories of individuals in the 1968
families: Relationship History File, 1985 - 2001. This information is used to construct marriage history information for
the parents of our study sample. To construct parental marriage history information, information included in the same ﬁle
between married pairs is linked to the parent-child pair. Individuals for whom mother’s marital history is either missing
or incomplete are dropped.
12Due to the PSID study design, information on the exact grade completed in each year for a given individual is not
reported, unless the individual has completed all formal education. Given this setup, the exact grade of schooling attained
for each individual at each age is largely missing. To deal with this issue, we checked whether the time in which the ﬁnal
grade of schooling attained and reported was appropriate given the age of the individual. If the ﬁnal grade of schooling
reported is within two grade-levels that are reasonable for an individual of a given age, then such individuals are included.
The assumption made is that even if an individual takes a few years longer to achieve a certain grades of schooling, i.e.
dropping out or left behind for a short period, it is the fact that he or she completed the particular grade of schooling that
is important. Given the data limitation, this study cannot address the issue of repeated spells of schooling. The estimates
would likely reﬂect a lower bound of the divorce effect, if children from divorced families on average are more likely
to take more than two years to complete any particular grades of schooling, or be left behind in school for an extended
period.
6additional criteria: (1) mother’s marital history is identiﬁed; (2) born within the marriage of one’s
biological parents; and (3) household socioeconomic information is available annually during the
observational period; and (4) experienced parental divorce prior to completion of all formal schooling.
Table (1) presents the summary statistics and variable deﬁnitions. The ﬁnal sample consists of
3,044 individuals from 2,004 family units, all born within the marriage of their biological parents.
Multiple children are observed for 60% of the family units. Approximately 20% of individuals (26%
of the families) experienced parental divorce while growing up. 13 A sizable portion of the divorced
mothers, roughly 48% of the sample, eventually remarried.
4 Econometric Model
Parents’ child investment and marital dissolution are modeled as joint decision processes. The two
outcomes are represented by the durations since a child’s birth until the occurrences of a child’s
schooling completion and parents’ divorce, respectively. The timing until each event, while at risk, is
modeled as a continuous-time hazard function. The hazard function describes the conditional proba-
bility that the event will take place at time t, given that it has not yet occurred by time t, conditional
on observable characteristics and family level heterogeneity.
For each set of parents i, the duration of schooling for their jth child (Ts
i,j) and the duration of their
marriage (Tm
i ) are modeled jointly. The time dimension is deﬁned with respect to the age of each
child in a family. For child j from family i, the hazard of schooling exit (hs
i,j) and the hazard of the
parent’s marital dissolution (hm

















The pair of baseline piecewise-linear spline variables, Durs(t) and Durm(t), accounts for potential
underlying duration dependence.14 The baseline schooling exit hazard, Durs(t), reﬂects a child’s ac-
13Children from divorced families experienced divorce at different ages while growing up: 38% by the age of 6, 35%
between the age of 6 to 12, and 27% after the age of 12 (Not shown).
14Duration dependence refers to when the hazard changes continuously with time.
7cumulation of human capital, hence the risk of schooling exit (i.e. dropping out of school) is expected
to rise as the child grows up. The baseline divorce hazard, Durm(t), accounts for the accumulation
of marital-speciﬁc capital and information about the quality of their match. The risk of divorce may
initially rise and then eventually decline as the marriage endures (Lillard and Waite, 1993).15
4.1 Exit Hazard of Schooling
To examinewhether theeffect ofparentaldivorce iscausal indetermining the poorchild outcomes, in-
ﬂuences from observed factors such as pre-existing socioeconomic disadvantages, must ﬁrst be ruled
out (Painter and Levine, 2000). The quality of their match not only affects a couples’ decision of
whether to stay married, but may also inﬂuence parents’ investment strategies toward their children
before and after divorce. Therefore, the quantity and quality of both parental time and material in-
vestments, and the timing of these investments, are important factors in determining child educational
outcomes and correlated with family structure.
The vector Xi,j(t) consists of both time-varying and time-invariant measures to account for par-
ents’ investments in children. Family-speciﬁc measures (i.e., constant across all siblings) include
parents’ educational backgrounds, household income, number of offspring within the marriage, and
race. Since the observational unit of the exit hazard of schooling is constructed with respect to each
child, several measures vary across siblings (child-speciﬁc): Gender, birth order, mother’s age at
15For a general speciﬁcation of the baseline duration dependence, the piece-wise linear speciﬁcation building on the
Gompertz proportional hazard is employed. (For notational convenience, the subscripts (i, j) are suppressed here). ps1 and
pm1 are vectors of slope coefﬁcients associated with the vectors of linear spline variables, Durs and Durm, respectively.
The spline variable for the kth interval between ls
k−1 and ls
k in the schooling duration, and the spline variable for the lth
interval between lm
l−1 and lm
l in the marriage duration are given by:
Durs









The nodes (or cut-off points) are chosen to be at 6, 10, and 12 for the schooling duration (i.e. ls
1 = 6, ls
2 = 10, ls
3 = 12,
ls
4 = ¥) to denote important breaks in formal education at 6th, 10th and 12th grades; and the nodes for parental marriage
duration are 5, 10, and 15 (i.e. lm
1 = 5, lm
2 = 10, lm
3 = 15, lm
4 = ¥). The estimates reported in this study are robust to the















8childbirth, number of children or adults living in the household at age t,16 urban residence at age t,
and geographical location of current residence at age t.
Family structure changes are represented by the vector Mi,j(t), which includes two time-varying
binary variables, Divorcei,j(t) and Remarriagei,j(t). Divorcei,j(t) is equal to 1 if the parents of child
j from family i report to be divorced when the child is of age t (and thereafter). This is to account for
the effect of divorce, its timing,17 and the duration of exposure to parental divorce on the exit hazard
of child schooling. Many divorced parents eventually remarry, and about half of the children from
divorced families experience living with a stepparent while growing up (Furstenberg and Cherlin,
1991).18 Remarriagei,j(t) is equal to 1 if the mother is in a subsequent marriage when the child is at
age t, to account for potential advantages (or disadvantages) associated with having a stepparent.19
Finally, conditional on observed characteristics, children from some families may be more likely
to dropout of school early, due to differences in endowments or parenting behavior. These individuals
will tend to have lower educational attainments (or shorter schooling durations). Unobserved charac-
teristics that may inﬂuence attainments of all children within a family are captured in the error term,
es
i, the effect of which is removed from the schooling exit.
4.2 Hazard of Marital Dissolution
Weiss and Willis (1997) theorize that couples divorce if the gains from being single exceed that
of staying married. Parents face substantially higher costs of dissolving their marriage compared
to childless couples, since having children represents a long-term commitment to the marriage and
requires continuous investments. Assuming that the quality of children is a desired martial speciﬁc
16“Children” refers to individuals at most 17 years of age; and “Adults” refers to those at least 18 years old.
17Liu (2004) examines the timing of parental divorce on child educational attainments, by allowing for separate baseline
hazards for children whose parents divorced at varying age ranges.
18“Divorce” and “Remarriage” deﬁned here refer to legal divorces and marriages only. While parental separation is also
potentially an event of interest, for many in the PSID, this information tends to be missing. In addition, since separation
can be either a formal or an informal arrangement, and not necessarily legally required prior to divorce, it is unclear
whether the missing information on separation is due to under-reporting or that the couple never separated. Given that the
focus of this study is on the effect of “divorce”, the main results are based on the legal deﬁnition of divorce only. However,
we also examine the effect of “disruptions”, which treat both (reported) separations and divorces as similar events, on the
educational attainment of children. The results are reported in the next section.
19Potential beneﬁts to children of having a stepparent may include additional parenting time and resources, and ﬂexibil-
ity in the coordination of supervision. However, there may also be disadvantages associated with living with a stepfather,
such as higher risks of sexual abuse for girls (Russell, 1984; Gordon, 1989).
9capital, parents may internalize the potential gains (or costs) for their children when making the
decision of whether to divorce.
Costs of divorce include potential loss of economic resources and social networks, besides legal
fees. There are also non-pecuniary costs to be considered. During the process of divorce, children
can suffer from separation from one parent, parental hostility, and residential dislocation (Painter and
Levine, 2000). However, on the margin, there may also be gains to divorce. Divorce usually does
not occur when marital relations are good, but rather when it deteriorates.20 Couples may react to the
stress by arguing constantly, choose not to communicate, or in the extreme case resort to violence.
Hence removing children from a potentially hostile home environment can also be beneﬁcial.
The risk of marital dissolution depends on a vector of explanatory variables, Xm
i (t), including:
Order of the marriage, number of children within the marriage, mother’s age at marriage, parental ed-
ucational backgrounds, (log) average household annual income,21 and race. Higher order marriages
are more likely than ﬁrst marriages to end in divorce (Hetherington et al., 1998). Lillard and Waite
(1993) ﬁnd that instability within a marriage decreases a couple’s commitment to have children, hence
the number of children within a marriage may be correlated the overall quality of the match. Race
is included to account for racial differences in marriage market opportunities.22 Additional exclu-
sionary restrictions, Zi(t), are included in the divorce hazard. Differences in the dates that each state
enacted no-fault and/or unilateral divorce legislations23 and state divorce rates provide sources of both
longitudinal and cross-sectional variation, as suggested by Gruber (2004).24
Some couples may be more divorce-prone relative to others, even conditional on observed char-
acteristics. Parents who are less committed to their families may be less effective as parents and as
spouses (Lillard and Waite, 1993), and may be more likely to divorce earlier. Unobserved couple
20Economic distress, extra-marital affairs, substance abuse, and behavioral or medical problems (among others) are
frequently cited as causes for divorce (Manski et al., 1992).
21Our results are robust to how household income is deﬁned. Estimation results using (log) time-varying annual house-
hold income is reported in Appendix Table 1.
22Rank and Davis (1996) ﬁnd that the racial differences in marriage and divorce rates can be explained by racial
differences in marital attitudes and perceived outside opportunities.
23Our study sample were born and grew up in a period that coincides with dramatic changes in divorce policies in
the U.S.. The state of California passed the ﬁrst “No Fault” divorce legislation in 1970, and many states further passed
legislations for “Unilateral” divorce. Both types of legislation alleviated the costly process of divorce by removing the
necessity of fault grounds, with the main difference being that while no fault divorce still requires the mutual consent of
both partners, unilateral divorce only requires the consent of one of the partners.
24Data on state divorce legislations are obtained from Friedberg (1998).
10heterogeneity is incorporated in the residual term, em
i .
4.3 Simultaneity
The estimated effect of divorce may be biased if the endogeneity of divorce is ignored (Pindyck and
Rubinfeld, 2000). Two unobserved heterogeneity components are included in the model, es
i and em
i ,
each representing the effects of unmeasured latent risk factors that are not included in the model and

































The estimated correlation coefﬁcient of the two heterogeneity terms, b r, is expected to be positive,
given that unobserved factors that increase parents’ propensity to divorce, should also increase the
probability that the individual completes fewer grades of schooling.
4.4 Estimation
The baseline survivor functions25 for the schooling duration of child j of family i , and the duration


















0 are the child’s age at the beginning of schooling and his/er parents’





































25The survival probability of an event at time t is the probability that the event had not yet occurred by t.
11representing the conditional probabilities of censored marriage and schooling durations. The vector
W(t) denotes the full history of the covariates (Xs
j(t), Xm(t), Mj(t), Z(t)) since the beginning of
schooling or the parents’ marriage until age t. The sub time intervals in which the time-varying
covariates are constant are denoted by k (k = 1,...,Ks
j or Km). For completed spells, the conditional





fm(t|W(t),em) = Sm(t|W(t),em)hm(t|em) (8)
These survivor and density functions may be combined into the conditional likelihood functions




















j∗ denotes complete duration and t
p
j∗∗ denotes the time at censoring.
The joint probabilities of observed outcomes conditional on the vector of unobserved heterogene-
ity components (es,em) is the product of the individual conditional probabilities: Ls
ij(es) and Lm
i (em)
for family i. Because the heterogeneity components are included to represent the common part of
behavior after controlling for the covariates, the conditional probabilities are independent (Lillard
and Waite, 1993). Consequently, the contribution to the joint likelihood of family i’s complete set
of outcomes is the integral of the joint conditional likelihood over the range of the jointly normal




















where J denotes the total number of children.
The following features of this model are useful for reducing the bias in estimated effect of divorce.
First, theexithazardofschoolingisafunctionoftime-varyingcovariates, whichaccountsfordynamic
changes in observable factors surrounding the child while growing up. Second, the timing of divorce
12is incorporated in the child’s exit hazard of schooling. To account for the potential endogeneity of
divorce, the process of parental marital dissolution is explicitly modeled and estimated jointly with
the exit hazard of child schooling. Endogeneity in this case means that the risk of schooling exit (or
“droppingout”)isdeterminedsimultaneouslywithinthesystemandmaycorrelatewithunobservables
affecting parental marital dissolution. Each of the two heterogeneity terms, es
i and em
i , represents
time-invariant unmeasured factors within the family that are not included in the model and a source
of correlation across the two equations.
Thecoefﬁcientvectors(ps0,ps1,ps2,ps3,pm0,pm1,pm2,pm3,ss,sm,r)areestimatedwithinthemodel
usingFullInformationMaximumLikelihoodviatheaMLMultiprocessMultilevelModelingsoftware
(Lillard and Panis, 2003). The piecewise linear Gompertz distribution, which is ﬂexible and imposes
very little restrictions on the baseline hazard, is assumed here. The separate identiﬁcation of the
variances, s2
s and s2
m, generally rely on the presence of multiple outcome spells (Brien et al., 1999).
Recall that our interest is to understand the implications of divorce between the biological parents,
and since it is rare that the same couple marry each other multiple times, only single marriage spells
are observed. Nevertheless, 60% of the families in our sample have multiple children and we are able
to identify the model by exploiting variation in the schooling outcomes across siblings.26
5 Estimation Results
This section presents the estimation results of the joint hazard model of child schooling attainments
and parental marital dissolution speciﬁed in Equations (1) and (2).27 To illustrate the importance
of endogenizing parental divorce, the child’s exit hazard of schooling as speciﬁed in Equation (1)
is ﬁrst estimated separately, which assumes that parental divorce is exogenous.28 The results are
then compared to the estimates of the joint model. The estimated coefﬁcient of parental divorce,
26The normality assumption on the heterogeneity terms also provide identifying information (Brien et al., 1999).
27The results presented here do not separate children from bereaved families (5% of total sample) as a separate category
from the control group, i.e., children from intact families. Nevertheless, the estimated results are robust to treating parental
bereavement as a separate control group (Available upon request from the author).
28The single equation exit hazard of schooling is estimated including the unobserved heterogeneity component, es.
This procedure is similar to the one developed by Butler and Mofﬁt (1982) for random-effect panel probit models. In this
framework, the hazard function is speciﬁed conditional on es, and integrates over the distribution of possible values of es.
13Divorce(t), on the exit hazard of child schooling, is presented in Table (2).29,30
5.1 Effect of Divorce on Child Educational Attainment
The estimated effect of parental divorce in the single-equation schooling exit hazard is presented in
the ﬁrst column in Table (2). After accounting for demographic characteristics, the estimated effect
of divorce on the exit hazard of child schooling is 0.349. This means that a child who experienced
divorce while growing up would achieve 1−exp−0.349 = 29% fewer years of schooling, compared
to a child with similar demographic backgrounds growing up in an intact family. Household income
tends to be lower for divorced families (Duncan and Hoffman, 1985).31 Even if the non-custodial
parent is committed to providing child support, the economic costs of maintaining two households
are much higher. In turn, fewer resources are available for these children. Consistent with previous
ﬁndings, controlling for household income reduces the estimated effect of divorce, but the effect
remains signiﬁcant.32
In addition, non-monetary investments in children, such as time spent with children and parental
supervision, may change due to divorce. On the one hand, the absent parent may spend less time with
the child, even if he or she exercises full visitation rights (Fronstin et al., 2001). The added household
responsibilities may induce the custodial parent to increase labor force participation, therefore spend
less time (or quality time) with her children. However, time investments in children need not decrease
signiﬁcantly due to potential substitution of parenting time by other relatives. The custodial parent
may enter into living arrangements, such as moving in with grandparents or other family members,
29Separations are also examined and discussed later in this section.
30Detail of results, as in Model (c) of Table (2), are presented as Model (1) in the Appendix.
31Despite the stricter child support laws passed recently, about 50% of non-custodial fathers who are required to pay
child support do not pay the full amount, and 25% of these fathers do not pay at all (Peters et al., 1993).
32Household income is deﬁned as the sum of income from all sources of every adult living in the same household as the
child at timet, to account for resources immediately available to the child at each point in time. Treating household income
as a time-varying covariate controls for variations of resources over time. However, since this variable is highly collinear
with changes in family structure and number of adults living in the same household at time (t), as living situations change
with parental divorce, a permanent measure of household income, the (log) average annual household income, is used in
the main speciﬁcation. The complete estimates of the joint model using either the permanent income (Model 1) and the
time-varying income (Model 2) measures are presented in Appendix Table (1). The results are robust to either measures
of household income. It is worth noting that the estimated effect of “Number of adults living in the household” is negative
and signiﬁcant if permanent income is used, but not when time-varying household income is used. This may indicate
that children beneﬁt by having additional adults in the household, and the beneﬁt is largely transitional attributable to
additional resources available due to living arrangements changes.
14for additional help with taking care of her children. The quality of time investments may also improve
after divorce, as marital conﬂicts have potentially ended, and the parents may devote more attention
to their children’s needs. Controlling for home investments33 further reduces the magnitude of the
effect of parental divorce. After controlling for a full set of observable characteristics and how they
vary with changes in family structure over time, the estimated effect of divorce on the exit hazard of
child schooling is positive, but no longer signiﬁcant.
Investment in children’s human capital and parents’ marital dissolution may both be endogenous
to unobserved factors. The estimated effect of divorce on child schooling duration of the joint model
is presented in the second column of Table (2).34 In addition, the extent in which the two processes are
inter-related is examined. The signiﬁcance of the heterogeneity components, and more importantly,
the correlations of these components across the two equations are estimated.
Once the correlation between divorce and child attainments is controlled for, parental divorce is
no longer associated with increasing the exit hazard of child schooling (i.e. higher probability of
dropping out of school early) compared to children from intact families. The unobserved factors
that jointly inﬂuence children’s schooling attainments and parents’ divorce outcome largely explain
the lower educational attainments of children experienced with divorce. The correlation coefﬁcient
between the unobserved error terms, r, is positive and signiﬁcant, regardless of the speciﬁcation
chosen. This is consistent with the hypothesis that unobserved factors that increase the likelihood of
divorce are also likely to increase the child’s probability of dropping out of school early, and hence
have lower educational attainments.
The negative coefﬁcient estimate of divorce in the joint model may be surprising, however the
sign of the divorce effect on child outcomes is theoretically ambiguous. While separating from a
parent can reduce available socioeconomic and parenting resources for children, shielding them from
parental conﬂicts and stress may be beneﬁcial. However, under the assumption that the joint model
potentially accounts for these unobserved factors (e.g., stress, marital conﬂicts), it is unlikely that
33The variables included in “Home Investments” are the following: Total number of children (including all persons
under the age of 18) and adults living in the same household at time t are included to proxy for available parental time that
may be devoted to a child. Parents’ educational background and mother’s age at childbirth are indicative of the quality
of the investments and parents’ ability to utilize these inputs efﬁciently. Birth order of the child may be important in
determining the amount and potential competition for parental investments.
34The complete set of estimates of the fully speciﬁed joint model, as in (C) in Table (2), is presented as Model (1) in
Appendix Table (1). Details of estimates of speciﬁcations (A) and (B) are available upon request from the author.
15the estimated effect reﬂects such beneﬁts. Therefore, if there were potential beneﬁts associated with
getting a divorce, it may be working through other channels.
It is unlikely that changes in available resources offer an explanation. The estimated effect of
divorce is magniﬁed once household income is included. This is reasonable since the pressure of
economic hardship may increase the chance of divorce for low-income couples.35 This combined with
furtherreductionofavailableresourcesafterthedivorcehaveanegativeimpactonchildattainments.36
However, differences in home investments potentially offer an explanation. South (2001), using the
PSID, ﬁnds that wife’s educational attainment decreases marital stability. We also ﬁnd that others
who are more educated are relatively more likely to divorce compared to less educated mothers.37
Since mothers are the likely custodial parent, those who are more able to protect and care of their
children on their own may be more likely to divorce if the quality of the match is poor. Although
past studies report that divorced mothers display lower levels of monitoring and discipline than those
who are married, substantial variability in parenting practices are found (Simons et al., 1993), with a
majorityofdivorcedmothersdisplaycompetentparentingskills(Simons, 1996). Inaddition, potential
substitution of parenting time by other relatives38, as living arrangements may change after divorce,
can also help to mediate the effect of the loss of parenting time by the absent parent.
5.2 Separation and Remarriages
Divorce is a legal break of ties between family members, as oppose to separations. After separating,
couples may decide to divorce if marital relations appear irreparable. This implies that marriages
with more severe conﬂicts may be more likely to end in divorce. Children may still suffer from the
antagonistic parental relations during separation; given there may be more contact between couples
and their children during separation compared to after a divorce. Although separation from a parent
may be stressful, children may learn to cope with the absence of a resident parent during this time. By
35The estimated effect of (log) household income on the hazard of parental divorce is reported in Appendix Table (1).
Higher household income is associated with lower probability of divorce.
36Newman (1988) ﬁnds that children’s responses to declines in varied according to their mother’s coping strategies and
their ages at the time of divorce.
37Estimated effect of mother’s educational background is presented in Model (1) in the Appendix.
38An increasing share of mothers enter into cohabitation arrangements following the divorce (Bumpass et al., 1995).
Parenting time provided by non-marital partners is also a potential source of additional time investments for these children.
16the time parents formalize their divorce, the negative effect of the disruption may have been lessened.
In the previous section, we considered the effect of formal divorce only, which begins at the actual
divorce date. Formal divorce may be preceded by a period of separation (formal or informal), and
the estimated effect of divorce on child attainments may include the effects of separation. Table (3)
presents the estimated effect of family disruptions on child educational attainments, in which both
formal divorces and separations are considered as “disruptions”.39 In line with estimates of divorce,
after controlling for demographic characteristics, household income, and home investments, family
disruptions are no longer associated with lower educational attainments in children.
The long-term effect of divorce may be confounded by the effects of subsequent remarriages
(Bronstein et al., 1993). About half of the divorced mothers in our sample eventually remarried. Chil-
dren who grow up in stepparent families are found to have worse educational outcomes (McLanahan
and Sandefur, 1994; Biblarz and Raftery, 1999; and Boggess, 1998), and less adjusted compared
to children in ﬁrst marriage families, although the differences tend to be small and are not always
found (Kurdek and Sinclair, 1988). While having a stepparent may provide additional resources for
children, the presence of a stepparent may also cause conﬂict between the biological parent and the
child (Hetherington and Henderson, 1997). In addition, child investments made by a stepparent may
be insufﬁcient compared to a biological parent (Hofferth, 2003; McLanahan and Sandefur, 1994).
Appendix Table (2) presents the estimates of the fully speciﬁed joint model with and without control-
ling for remarriage. Remarriage has no signiﬁcant impact on child attainments, independent from the
effect of divorce and socioeconomic status.
6 Summary and Conclusion
Children of divorced parents are generally found to have lower educational attainments compared to
their counterparts raised in intact families. While socioeconomic and other observed disadvantages
associated with divorce partially explains the child outcome differences between the two family types,
evidence on whether divorce in itself has a causal effect on children remains inconclusive, as factors
39The period of disruption is deﬁned beginning at either the separation date or the divorce date, whichever is earlier.
The variable “Disruption(t)” is deﬁned as to be equal to 1 if the biological parents are either separated or divorced at time
t.
17that drive both the divorce and child outcomes are often unobserved and not easily accounted for.
This study examines whether parental divorce has a causal effect on the educational attainment
of children involved. Using annual data on a representative sample of children and their families
since childbirth until the completion of their schooling, we model child’s schooling attainments and
parents’ marital dissolution as joint decision processes, where unobservables triggering divorce and
affecting child development are assumed to be correlated. After accounting for both observed and
unobserved characteristics, we ﬁnd no evidence that the lower educational attainments is attributable
to parents’ divorce per se, but rather due to unobserved factors that are correlated with divorce. This
result is robust to a more general deﬁnition of relationship dissolution, by treating spousal separation
and divorce both as family “disruptions”.
While further research is into the mechanisms through which parents’ divorce affects child attain-
ments is needed, our ﬁndings provide some evidence that divorce in itself does not negatively affect
children’s educational outcomes. The reasons for dissolving a marriage tend to be family-speciﬁc and
usually observed only by the parties involved. Assuming that parents are altruistic and internalize
potential gains (and costs) of dissolving their marriage on their children when deciding to divorce, on
the margin there may be beneﬁts to divorce (at least for some). If our goal is to help children from
divorced families to become self-reliant adults, policy-makers need to be mindful that divorce in itself
may be a consequence, rather than a culprit, of the same underlying mechanism that causes the in-
ferior child outcomes. Simply restricting access to divorce without consideration of individual needs
and circumstances can be irresponsible; it may also risk jeopardizing the welfare of many families
and their children.
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22Table 1: Variable Deﬁnition and Means
Variable Name Deﬁnition Mean (Standard Dev.)
Outcome Variable
Child Educational Attainment Highest grade attained 12.31(1.470)
Explanatory Variables
(Time-Invariant)
Intact 1 if family stayed intact 0.745(0.436)
Divorced 1 if family divorced 0.207(0.405)
Bereaved 1 if family bereaved 0.048(0.214)
Age at Divorce (0 ≤ Age < 6) 1 if parents divorced between birth and age 6 0.079(0.269)
Age at Divorce (6 ≤ Age < 10) 1 if parents divorced between ages 6 and 10 0.051(0.221)
Age at Divorce (10 ≤ Age < 12) 1 if parents divorced between ages 10 and 12 0.022(0.146)
Age at Divorce (12 ≤ Age) 1 if parents divorced after age 12 0.056(0.229)
Race: White 1 if race is White 0.682(0.466)
Race: Black 1 if race is Black 0.224(0.417)
Race: Other 1 if race if Other 0.094(0.292)
Female 1 if child is female 0.481(0.500)
Birth Order Birth order of the child 2.369(1.842)
Mother’s Education Highest grade attained by mother 11.89(3.323)
Father’s Education Highest grade attained by father 11.86(3.836)
Mother’s Age at Marriage Mother’s age at this marriage 20.53(3.890)
Mother’s Age at Childbirth Mother’s age at childbirth 25.39(5.647)
Number of Children Total number of children within this marriage 3.211(1.844)
Marriage Order Order of this marriage (mother) 1.058(0.250)
2nd or Higher Order Marriage 1 if this is a second or higher order marriage (mother) 0.057(0.232)
Mother Remarry 1 if mother eventually remarried 0.091(0.289)
Catholic 1 if family religion “Catholic” 0.345(0.475)
Baptist 1 if family religion “Baptist” 0.258(0.438)
Average HH Income Average annual household income (1000s in 1984 $) 25.67(17.73)
Average State Divorce Rate Average annual state divorce rate (state of residence) 5.071(1.452)
NF Div. State (% MarDur) Reside in No-Fault Div. State (% of Marriage Duration) 0.900(0.121)
UNI Div. State (% MarDur) Reside in Unilat. Div. State (% of Marriage Duration) 0.503(0.429)
(Time-Variant)
Divorce(t) 1 if parents are divorced at time t 0.120(0.325)
Remarried(t) 1 if mother is remarried at time t 0.040(0.195)
ln HH Income (t) ln(Total Household Income at time t) 7.806(4.269)
Children(t) Total number of children living in the household at time t 2.377(1.406)
Adults(t) Total number of adults living in the household at time t 2.362(0.964)
State Divorce Rate(t) State divorce rate at time t (state of residence) 5.049(1.572)
No-Fault Divorce State(t) 1 if living in No-Fault divorce state at time t 0.929(0.257)
Unilateral Divorce State(t) 1 if living in Unilateral divorce state at time t 0.550(0.498)
North East(t)1 1 if household living in the northeast at time t 0.150(0.357)
North Central(t)1 1 if household living in north central at time t 0.201(0.400)
South(t)1 1 if household living in the south at time t 0.427(0.495)
West(t)1 1 if household living in the west at time t 0.222(0.416)
Urban(t)2 1 if household living in an urban area at time t 0.334(0.472)
Num. of Individuals = 3,044
Num. of Families = 2,004
Notes:
1. PSID regional classiﬁcation is used;
2. The location of residence is deﬁned as “Urban” if the population of the largest city in the county of residence exceeds
100,000.
23Table 2: Effect of Parental Divorce on the Exit Hazard of Child Schooling: Estimated Coefﬁcient of
[Divorce(t)] and the Correlation Coefﬁcient [r]
Single-Eq. Schooling Hazard Model Joint Hazard Model
(Divorce = Exogenous) (Divorce = Endogenous)
Coefﬁcient Coefﬁcient r
Controls
(A) Demographics 0.349∗ −0.623∗ 0.783∗
(0.111) (0.177) (0.178)
(B) Demographics + Avg. HH Inc 0.257∗ −0.754∗ 0.830∗
(0.111) (0.174) (0.177)
(C) Demographics + Avg. HH Inc + Home Inv. 0.084 −0.479∗ 0.484∗
(0.116) (0.209) (0.183)
Notes:
1. Estimated coefﬁcient on (Divorce(t)) from three speciﬁcations of the exit hazard of child schooling are reported here.
All three speciﬁcations control for mother’s subsequent remarriage (mother remarried(t)) in the exit hazard of child
schooling;
2. The control variables are: “Demographics” = Demographic characteristics, which include child gender, birth cohort,
racial background, region of residence, and urban residence; “Avg. HH Inc” denotes (log) average annual household
income; and “Home Inv.” = Home Investment Controls, which include parental education background, mother’s age at
childbirth, number of children living in the household, number of adults living in the household, and birth order of the
child;
3. Standard errors reported in the parentheses.
4. ∗ = Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level;
5. Speciﬁcation (C) is our preferred model and the complete estimation results are presented in the Appendix and referred
to as Model (1).
24Table 3: The Effect of Marital Disruptions on the Exit Hazard of Child Schooling: Estimated Coefﬁ-
cient of [Disruption(t)] and the Correlation Coefﬁcient [r]
Single-Eq. Schooling Hazard Model Joint Hazard Model
(Disruption = Exogenous) (Disruption = Endogenous)
Controls Coefﬁcient Coefﬁcient r
Controls
(A) Demographics 0.389∗ −0.578∗ 0.780∗
(0.108) (0.178) (0.190)
(B) Demographics + Avg. HH Inc 0.295∗ −0.728∗ 0.846∗
(0.109) (0.174) (0.191)
(C) Demographics + Avg. HH Inc + Home Inv. 0.139 −0.360 0.404∗
(0.113) (0.211) (0.172)
Notes:
1. “Disruption(t)” = 1 if parents are either separated or divorced at time t. Estimated coefﬁcient on (Disruptions(t)) from
three speciﬁcations of the exit hazard of child schooling are reported here. All three speciﬁcations control for mother’s
subsequent remarriage (mother remarried(t)) in the exit hazard of child schooling;
2. The control variables are: “Demographics” = Demographic characteristics, which include child gender, birth cohort,
racial background, region of residence, and urban residence; “Avg. HH Inc” denotes (log) average annual household
income; and “Home Inv.” = Home Investment Controls, which include parental education background, mother’s age at
childbirth, number of children living in the household, number of adults living in the household, and birth order of the
child;
3. Standard errors reported in the parentheses;
4. ∗ = Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
25Appendix Table 1: Joint Hazard Model of Child Schooling and Parental Marital Dissolution:
Alternative Measures of Household Income
Model 1 Model 2
Single Equation Model Joint Model Single Equation Model Joint Model
Schooling Hazard (lnhs(t))†
Divorce(t) 0.084 −0.480∗ 0.057 −0.451∗
(0.116) (0.209) (0.114) (0.204)
Mother Remarried(t) 0.192 0.151 0.244 0.204
(0.143) (0.143) (0.144) (0.146)
Female −0.345∗ −0.347∗ −0.343∗ −0.344∗
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
Birth Order 0.184∗ 0.193∗ 0.168∗ 0.175∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
Race: Black −0.279∗ −0.272∗ −0.334∗ −0.325∗
(0.094) (0.095) (0.093) (0.094)
Race: Other 0.052 0.017 0.083 0.056
(0.120) (0.127) (0.118) (0.123)
Mother’s Education (< 12 Years) 0.750∗ 0.709∗ 0.739∗ 0.710∗
(0.096) (0.100) (0.096) (0.099)
Mother’s Education (≥ 16 Years) −0.469∗ −0.425∗ −0.418∗ −0.385∗
(0.127) (0.130) (0.127) (0.129)
Father’s Education (< 12 Years) 0.264∗ 0.104 0.246∗ 0.109
(0.101) (0.116) (0.100) (0.110)
Father’s Education (≥ 16 Years) −0.664∗ −0.804∗ −0.629∗ −0.765∗
(0.124) (0.131) (0.122) (0.129)
Mother’s Age at Childbirth −0.057∗ −0.057∗ −0.056∗ −0.056∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Num. Children in HH(t) 0.086∗ 0.084∗ 0.080∗ 0.078∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Num. Adults in HH(t) −0.077∗ −0.079∗ −0.033 −0.034
(0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030)
ln[Average HH Income] −0.087∗ −0.126∗
(0.025) (0.032)
ln[HH Income(t)] −0.209∗ −0.215∗
(0.038) (0.038)
Durs0−11 1.577 1.521 1.585 1.593
(1.371) (1.360) (1.378) (1.384)
Durs11−15 1.181∗ 1.186∗ 1.167∗ 1.169∗
(0.079) (0.080) (0.079) (0.079)
Durs15−17 1.526∗ 1.525∗ 1.510∗ 1.509∗
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
Durs17+ 0.555∗ 0.557∗ 0.535∗ 0.536∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039)
Constant −23.90 −22.70 −22.66 −22.51
(14.92) (14.79) (15.01) (15.08)
(Continued)
Notes:
1. Standard errors reported in parenthesis;
2. ∗ = Signiﬁcance at the 5% level;
† Additional controls (not reported) include birth cohort indicators, geographical region of residence, and indicator
variables for missing information in father’s education.Appendix Table 1 (Continued): Joint Hazard Model of Child Schooling and Parental Marital
Dissolution: Alternative Measures of Household Income
Model 1 Model 2
Single Equation Model Joint Model Single Equation Model Joint Model
Divorce Hazard (lnhm(t))b
2nd or Higher Order Marriage 1.318∗ 1.354∗
(0.363) (0.384)
Mother’s Age at Marriage −0.104∗ −0.107∗
(0.026) (0.027)
Num. Children in This Marriage (> 1) −0.788∗ −0.817∗
(0.236) (0.250)
Mother’s Education (< 12 Years) −0.514∗ −0.510∗
(0.192) (0.198)
Mother’s Education (≥ 16 Years) 0.343 0.338
(0.226) (0.234)
Father’s Education (< 12 Years) −2.106∗ −2.153∗
(0.427) (0.459)
Father’s Education (≥ 16 Years) −1.504∗ −1.555∗
(0.378) (0.408)
ln[Avg. HH Income] −0.329∗ −0.303∗
(0.109) (0.100)
Avg. State Divorce Rate −0.022 −0.021
(0.057) (0.059)
NF Div. State (% of MarDur) −0.139 −0.158
(0.533) (0.549)






Race: Black 0.045 0.048
(0.160) (0.164)












ss 1.113∗ 1.138∗ 1.082∗ 1.102∗





Log Likelihood −5499.53 −8105.77 −5486.37 −8093.51
Footnote:
1. Standard errors reported in parenthesis;
2. ∗ = Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.Appendix Table 2: Joint Hazard Model of Child Schooling and Parental Marital Dissolution: The
Effect of Remarriage
Model 1 Model 3
Single Equation Model Joint Model Single Equation Model Joint Model
Schooling Hazard (lnhs(t))†
Divorce(t) 0.084 −0.480∗ 0.167 −0.436∗
(0.116) (0.209) (0.102) (0.204)
Mother Remarried(t) 0.192 0.151
(0.143) (0.143)
Female −0.345∗ −0.347∗ −0.344∗ −0.346∗
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
Birth Order 0.184∗ 0.193∗ 0.182∗ 0.192∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Race: Black −0.279∗ −0.272∗ −0.295∗ −0.283∗
(0.094) (0.095) (0.093) (0.094)
Race: Other 0.052 0.017 0.045 0.011
(0.120) (0.127) (0.120) (0.127)
Mother’s Education (< 12 Years) 0.750∗ 0.709∗ 0.744∗ 0.703∗
(0.096) (0.100) (0.095) (0.099)
Mother’s Education (≥ 16 Years) −0.469∗ −0.425∗ −0.470∗ −0.424∗
(0.127) (0.130) (0.127) (0.130)
Father’s Education (< 12 Years) 0.264∗ 0.104 0.267∗ 0.101
(0.101) (0.116) (0.101) (0.116)
Father’s Education (≥ 16 Years) −0.664∗ −0.804∗ −0.664∗ −0.810∗
(0.124) (0.131) (0.124) (0.131)
Mother’s Age at Childbirth −0.057∗ −0.057∗ −0.057∗ −0.058∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Num. Children in HH(t) 0.086∗ 0.084∗ 0.088∗ 0.086∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Num. Adults in HH(t) −0.077∗ −0.079∗ −0.072∗ −0.075∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029)
ln[Average HH Income] −0.087∗ −0.126∗ −0.083∗ −0.124∗
(0.025) (0.032) (0.026) (0.032)
Durs0−11 1.577 1.521 1.578 1.590
(1.371) (1.360) (1.371) (1.378)
Durs11−15 1.181∗ 1.186∗ 1.181∗ 1.183∗
(0.079) (0.080) (0.079) (0.079)
Durs15−17 1.526∗ 1.525∗ 1.525∗ 1.524∗
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
Durs17+ 0.555∗ 0.557∗ 0.553∗ 0.556∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Constant −23.90 −22.70 −23.95 −23.46
(14.92) (14.79) (14.92) (15.00)
(Continued)
Notes:
1. Standard errors reported in parenthesis;
2. ∗ = Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level;
† Additional controls (not reported) include birth cohort indicators, geographical region of residence, and indicator
variables for missing information in father’s education.Appendix Table 2 (Continued): Joint Hazard Model of Child Schooling and Parental Marital
Dissolution: The Effect of Remarriage
Model 1 Model 3
Single Equation Model Joint Model Single Equation Model Joint Model
Divorce Hazard (lnhm(t))
2nd or Higher Order Marriage 1.318∗ 1.314∗
(0.363) (0.359)
Mother’s Age at Marriage −0.104∗ −0.103∗
(0.026) (0.025)
Num. Children in This Marriage (> 1) −0.788∗ −0.780∗
(0.236) (0.233)
Mother’s Education (< 12 Years) −0.514∗ −0.516∗
(0.192) (0.191)
Mother’s Education (≥ 16 Years) 0.343 0.344
(0.226) (0.225)
Father’s Education (< 12 Years) −2.106∗ −2.100∗
(0.427) (0.421)
Father’s Education (≥ 16 Years) −1.504∗ −1.501∗
(0.378) (0.373)
ln[Avg. HH Income] −0.329∗ −0.328∗
(0.109) (0.108)
Avg. State Divorce Rate −0.022 −0.022
(0.057) (0.057)
NF Div. State (% of MarDur) −0.139 −0.141
(0.533) (0.531)






Race: Black 0.045 0.048
(0.160) (0.159)












ss 1.113∗ 1.138∗ 1.110∗ 1.139∗





Log Likelihood −5499.53 −8105.77 −5500.45 −8106.34
Notes:
1. Standard errors reported in parenthesis;
2. ∗ = Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.